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KEEPING EPISTEMOLOGY SUPERNATURALIZED:
A REPLY TO ROSENKRANTZ
William E. Mann

I cannot hope to deal adequately with all the thoughtful points raised by Gary
Rosenkrantz. I would like to give some indication, however, of the direction in
which I think my responses should go.
Simplicity and Contingency. Rosenkrantz worries that my reliance on the
doctrine of divine simplicity forces me to deny that there are any contingent
facts. Since the major purpose of my paper is to show how it can be that God
has knowledge of contingent facts, my project turns out to be ironically hollow
if Rosenkrantz is right. Rosenkrantz offers an admirably lucid argument.
(1) God = God's omniscience.
(2) God's omniscience = God's knowledge that I am talking now.

Thus:
(3) God = God's knowledge that I am talking now.
(4) God's omniscience is an essential property of his.
(5) God has necessary existence.
But if God is (necessarily) simple, essentially omniscient, and necessarily existent, then it follows that if I am talking now, then in every possible world I am
talking now.
Now I accept very close relatives of (4) and (5), namely
(4') God is essentially omniscient
and
(5') God necessarily exists.
So if I am to evade Rosenkrantz' conclusion, I must find fault with (1) or (2).
I think in fact that (1) is ambiguous. Consider the phrase 'the knowledge of
God'. It can be interpreted either as 'the power or activity by which God knows
things' or as 'the content of God's knowing activity'. The former interpretation
is clearly intended in contexts like 'God's knowledge is non-inferential'. The
latter interpretation is called for in contexts like 'God's knowledge of mathematics
is complete'. If we transfer this ambiguity to 'God's omniscience', we get two
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possible readings of (1):
(I') God = the power or activity by which God knows all things.
(1 *) God = the complete content of God's all-extensive knowing activity.
Defenders of divine simplicity will accept (I') and reject (l *). Consistent with
(1'), (2) becomes
(2') The power or activity by which God knows all things
or activity by which God knows that I am talking now.

=

the power

Thus (3) becomes
(3') God
now.

=

the power or activity by which God knows that I am talking

Following Rosenkrantz' lead, we may ask now whether the identity expressed
by (3') is necessary or contingent. My answer is that it is necessary. That does
not imply that it is necessary that I am talking now. The power or activity by
which God knows all things is essential to God and invariant across possible
worlds. The content of God's knowledge, however, does vary across possible
worlds. That is to say, some of the things God knows are contingent. I
Simplicity and Noetic Properties. Here is the gist of a second argument of
Rosenkrantz' designed to show that simplicity is incompatible with contingency.
Consider the property of knowing that I am talking now. If God knows that I
am talking now, then he has this property. Either it is essential to him or
accidental. If essential (and if God exists necessarily), then my talking now is
not contingent. If accidental, then the property is not identical with God's being
omniscient (which we are supposing is essential to him). In the latter case, God
is not perfectly simple.
The argument gets off the ground only if there is such a property as knowing
that I am talking now. I am skeptical about the existence of this and kindred
properties. I hope to show that my skepticism is driven by something more than
a desire to avoid Rosenkrantz' argument.
Consider ordinary ascriptions of knowledge to humans. Or rather consider
ascriptions of beliefs to humans, since the other components of knowledge-a scriptions-truth, justification, and the mysterious quartum quid-are not relevant
here. Some belief-ascriptions pick out occurrent beliefs. If Smith sees that the
window is open, then he consciously believes that it is open. Other belief-ascriptions
pick out dispositional beliefs. Smith may believe that St. Paul is the capital of
Minnesota without presently entertaining the fact. Now if Smith believes occurrently that the window is open, then he is presently in a cognitive state connected
to some cognitive process-for example, visual perception-which he is under-
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going. Is the occurrent cognitive state a product or result of the cognitive process
or is it identical with the cognitive process? If you accept the former alternative,
then you may be inclined to think that believing that the window is open is a
property of Smith since it is one of his cognitive states and since there appears
to be no theoretical bar to identifying states with properties. But if, as the second
alternative has it, Smith's seeing that the window is open just is his (occurrentIy)
believing that it is open, then it is implausible to maintain that believing that
the window is open is a property of Smith. It is a Fregean fantasy to suggest
that if Smith is throwing a baseball, he is characterized, for one shining moment,
by the "property" throwing a baseball (soon to be replaced by having thrown a
baseball?). That way of speaking ignores the distinction between a process or
activity and a property.
We are now in a position to see how a simplicist should reply to Rosenkrantz.
A corollary of the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity maintains that God is
pure actuality, containing no tincture of potentiality. 2 If he believed something
dispositionally, then to that extent there would be unactualized potentiality in
God; he could have believed the item occurrently. The doctrine of God's pure
actuality thus entails that all his beliefs are occurrent. Moreover, God's being
simple and purely actual entails that there are no cognitive states in him distinct
from his cognitive activity. However things may stand with Smith's believing
that the window is open, God's believing that the window is open is not the
outcome or product of some cognitive process of his. For if it were, then there
would be either complexity or potentiality (or both) in God.
Since God's belief cannot be a product of any activity, it must be identical
with some activity of his. What activity? In my paper, I suggested that the
activity is his willing.
A Cold Shoulder to Tropical Ontologies. Rosenkrantz wonders how it can be
that God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent without his being powerful and
good. And surely the property of being powerful is distinct from the property
of being good. Yet if God is powerful and good, and if the doctrine of divine
simplicity is true, then God's goodness and power must be identical. How can
all this be so? Rosenkrantz claims, with considerable justification, that my answer
is to assert, not the identity of being powerful and being good, but rather the
identity of God's being powerful and God's being good.
When I wrote "Divine Simplicity," I was concerned to defend a view which
took expressions like 'the power of God' to refer to property instances or, as
Rosenkrantz calls them, tropes. The doctrine of divine simplicity which results
is proof against a series of objections to divine simplicity raised by Alvin Plantinga
in Does God Have a Nature? Rosenkrantz raises several penetrating questions
concerning an ontology of tropes, questions to which I cannot do justice here.
I do not believe that the objections force one to give up on tropes, but I shall
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not presently defend a tropical ontology. Instead, I shall conclude by speculating
briefly on an alternative account of the reference of terms like 'the power of
God', an account which I used to think was defenseless against Plantinga.
Suppose we take 'the power of God' as referring, naturally enough, to omnipotence, and 'the knowledge of God' as referring to omniscience. Then we will
have on our hands a version of divine simplicity which endorses identities like
'Omniscience = Omnipotence' and 'God = Omniscience'. The former identity
is one that even my tropical theory must defend,3 so the alternative theory fares
no worse on that score. The latter identity seems to fall prey to the following
Plantingesque objection. "Omniscience is a property. Thus if God = Omniscience, then God is a property. Now all properties are abstract objects, from
whence it follows that God is an abstract object. But God is a living, knowledgeable, powerful, loving person. No person is an abstract object. Therefore God
is not an abstract object. We have thus arrived at a contradiction, which is
precipitated by the assumption that God = Omniscience."
Why pick on the identity? I propose to pick on another premise, namely the
claim that no person is an abstract object. This premise gains its credence, I
suspect, by conflating two different features-or alleged features-of abstract
objects. On the one hand, it is often claimed that abstract objects-sets, propositions, meanings, and the like-are nonspatiotemporal in character. On the other
hand, abstract objects are sometimes said to be completely inert and feckless;
they exert no causal power. One might claim that these two features are connected,
perhaps by means of the thesis that everything outside space and time is causally
powerless. But the thesis is not obvious. Consider these two variations of the
suspect premise:
(6) No person is nonspatiotemporal.
(7) No person is completely feckless.
I can imagine mounting a persuasive argument for (7). To be a person, it might
be said, is to be an agent, a being who does some things, sets some plans into
motions, and so forth. The case for (6) is less clear. I see no reason to think
that there cannot be nonspatiotemporal persons. The doctrine of God's eternality
maintains that God is such a person, and I know of no convincing argument that
show that that doctrine is incoherent or inconsistent. Thus I find myself sympathetic to (7) and unmoved by (6).
Return now to the premise, 'No person is an abstract object'. Interpret it as
(6) and I will not accept it. Interpret it as (7) and I will accept it. Now, however,
the argument in which the premise is embedded yields only the conclusion that
God is not completely feckless. The contradiction has disappeared.
Of course the argument still has the subconclusion that God is a property.
Should that disturb us? I think not. If, as I believe, properties are causal powers,
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then it follows that God is a causal power. Most causal powers reside in their
subjects. If the doctrine of divine simplicity we have been probing is correct, it
turns out that one vast causal power-the source, in fact, of all other causal
powers-is identical with its subject.

University of Vermont

NOTES
1. I have made a similar point in "Simplicity and Immutability in God." pp. 273-274.
2. Space precludes my saying how pure actuality is supposed to be a corollary of simplicity. For
further discussion, see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann's "Absolute Simplicity," in this
issue, esp. sect. 7(i).
3. See "Divine Simplicity," pp. 464,468-471.

